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THE SAGA OF THE POLLUTION
EXCLUSION CLAUSE: HOW A
"SUDDEN" CHANGE
OCCURRED GRADUALLY
by THAD R. MULHOLLAND
he issues confronting insurers and
insureds in pollution damage claims
inherently differ from liability issues
that face other fields. Policy and economic
implications exist which are unlike other
discrete areas of insurance liability. These
differences become important in the context
of the social and political climate that cur-
rently exists.
As the environment has become a so-
cial, political and scientific issue in recent
years, courts have filled with environmental
litigation. Discussion of the environment is
so ubiquitous that even those skeptical of all
of the scientific data have a difficult time
denying the importance of environmental
issues. One unique aspect of the environ-
ment deserves especially close attention.
This comment examines the principal issues
in determining who will pay for pollution
damage.
The unique status of pollution damage
claims is attributable to several factors. First,
the pollution-causing activity usually occurs
over an extended period of time.' Such
events may involve the leaking of hazardous
waste from barrels for a period of years2, or
the accumulation and subsequent dispersal
of pesticide dust.3 Accordingly, as land uses
change, many evidentiary difficulties con-
front involved parties in their quest to at-
tribute pollution to a single event or source.
Second, the pollutant generally causes ex-
tensive damages.4 This significantly increases
the monetary stake involved, thereby in-
creasing the number of contested lawsuits.
Another exacerbating factorthatdistinguishes
pollution damage claims from standard in-
surance liability claims is the latency period
of many pollutants.5 In a large number of
these cases, the pollution and its effects go
unrecognized for many years. For example,
in contaminant disposal cases, contaminants
thought to be safely disposed of escape into
thegroundwater. 6 The polluters maybe long
gone when subsequent landowners discover
the pollution.
A final complicating factor is the pres-
ence of multiple claimants, defendants, and
insurance companies in cases contesting
substantial pollution claims.7 This is a result
of a surge in public opinion favoring environ-
mental protection8 accompanied by the pro-
mulgation and vigilant enforcement of strin-
gent regulations by state and federal govern-
ment agencies.9 Today, multiple tools exist
with which to hale polluters into court. The
net effect of these variables is more advo-
cates, more plaintiffs, and moredefendants. 0
Overwhelming public interest in the
environment further confuses some already
convoluted legal issues.n Often, the courts
that hear environmental pollution suits serve
as forums for public policy-making. Judge
Sprecher acknowledged the "sensitive" na-
ture of this issue in Izaak Walton League of
Am. v. The Atomic Energy Comm'n. 2 In
that case, the Court found that the defendant
did not give due consideration to the popu-
lation density and the uses of the site envi-
rons in approving the site of a commercial
nuclear reactor.13
Together these factors compound the
existing problems in most insurance liability
suits.' 4 As a result, determining who will pay
for pollution damages is difficult. In many
instances, the clean-up of a contaminated
1 James Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 FoRum 551 (1980).
2 Bureau of Engraving v. Federal Ins. Co., 1993 WL 382626 (8th Cir. Minn.).
3 Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22636 (11th Cir. Ga.).
4 Hourihan, supra note 1, at 551-2.
5 Hourihan, supra note 1. at 552.
6 See, e.g., White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. CL App. 1969).
7 Hourihan, supra note 1, at 552.
8 Robert S. Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance in Environmental Litigation, 11 FoRum 762, 762 (1976). "As the awareness of the magnitude, complexity and potentiality
of the ecology problem reflected in this proclamation slowly increased among private citizens, they tumed to the courts for the environmental protection they did not always obtain
through legislative bodies, administrative agencies or political pressure." Id.
9 In the past twenty years there have been numerous state and federal statutes enacted that govern pollution and polluters. These include: Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657 which imposes strict liability for past hazardous waste activities; the Clean WaterAct, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376; and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 which regulates the disposal of solid waste.
10 Soderstrom, supra note 8, at 763.
11 That is, trying to sort-out the complex fact scenarios, the issues of causation, and the tangle of state and federal regulations is a daunting task by itself without the sympathy
and concem that environmental issues evoke from the general public and the political pressure they apply to legislators and judges. Hourihan observed: "It is apparent that, since
environmental litigation is so imbued with the public interest, the forum in which the case is litigated may very well deterine the outcome of the litigation." Hourihan, supra note
1, at 555.
12 Izaak Walton League, 515 F.2d 513,515(7th Cir. 1975), rev'd 423 U.S. 12 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976.
13 Judge Sprecher wrote: "In view of the vast consequences of shutting off or delaying a potential source of considerable energy in these times of energy crisis, together with
the effect of such an occurrence upon the economic, financial and industrial well-being and development of Northern Indiana, obviously we cannot finally act without giving very
serious consideration to every possible factor which may conceivably bear upon the problem." Id. at 530.
14 Forinstance, compare the average environmental pollutionsuit and subsequent declaratoryjudgment action to determinewhether insurance coverage exists with the average
tort claim arising out of a car accident. In the latter, the insurer's liability will not be questioned in many cases because the facts can be tied to a specific incident and the bounds
of coverage are generally well-established. In addition, most personal injury cases involve one or two plaintiffs, and one or two insurance company defendants. Also, the general
public is completely disinterested in such matters. The typical environmental claim cannot be so simplified.26 MELPR
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site is delayed pending the outcome of these
cases.' 5 Unfortunately, prompt and consis-
tent resolutions of environmental insurance
claims are all too rare.
The proliferation of environmental dam-
age claims in the last twenty years and the
accompanying potential for huge damage
awards prompted the insurance industry to
take notice.'6 Because contract law gener-
ally determines insurance liability, the inter-
pretation of insurance contracts can vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The insur-
ance industry has tried to maximize consis-
tency in insurance contract interpretation
through the use of industry-wide standard
language.' 7
Insurers constantly endeavor to narrow
the scope of liability. Their primary weapon
in environmental law has been the "pollution
exclusion clause" ("clause").'8 The clause
eliminates all coverage for environmental
damage, but then excepts from the exclusion
those occurrences that are "sudden and
accidental." With this clause, the insurance
industry attempted to drastically narrow the
scope of insurer liability in light of public
outcries for environmental protection.' 9 A
typical clause reads as follows:
It is agreed that the insurance
does not apply to bodily injury or
property damage arising out of
the discharge, dispersal, release
or escape of smoke, chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials
or other irritants, contaminants
or pollutants into or upon land,
the atmosphere or any water-
course or body of water; but this
exclusion does not apply if such
discharge, dispersal, release or
escape is sudden and acciden-
tal.20
This much-maligned clause, a standard
exclusion under the comprehensive general
liability policy, contains the operative lan-
guage in deciding many pollution damage
cases. Muchto thefrustrationofthedrafters,
the mere presence of an exclusion has not
significantly diminished the liability of insur-
ers. Rather, judicial construction of this
clause often yields unpredictable, and, some-
times unexplainable, results.
Fiscal realities dictate that insurers and
insureds know exactly how liability policies
will be construed. For the insurance indus-
try, consistency in construction means that
insurers can more efficiently insure against
risks. If an insurer cannot discern the scope
of its obligation, "it cannot accurately calcu-
late the risk."21 One industry insider re-
marked that the only way insurers could
remain solvent was to be aware of their
liability obligations when they set their pre-
miums.Y In fact, the inconsistency with
which policy language has been construed
has compelled some insurers to exclude
completely from coverage all pollution dam-
ages.2
For the insureds, coherent judicial con-
struction is crucial for a number of reasons.
Foremost, more insurers24 could offer lower
premiums because of increased efficiency in
risk prediction."5 Currently, new regulations
and legislation mandate that entities in the
business of handling hazardous waste meet
financial responsibility requirements.? Most
satisfy these requirements with proof of li-
ability coverage for pollution contamina-
tion.Y However, many small contractors
cannot afford this insurance and, as a conse-
quence, cannot fulfill their contractual obli-
gations of cleansing hazardous waste sites
which further delays decontamination."
These events produce little more than "hin-
dered environmental progress.""
The logical conclusion is that a uniform
judicial construction of insurance contracts,
specifically in regard to the pollution exclu-
sion clause, would facilitate environmental
dean-up. Further, those courts that distort
the plain meaning of insurance contracts to
facilitate environmental dean-up must step
back and review the ramifications of their
decisions. Some courts' "well intentioned
zeal to compensate blameless victims [has
lead to the unwitting creation of a] new
15 E. J. Rosenkranz, Comment, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through The Looking Glass, 74GEO. LJ. 1237, 1278 (1986).
16 RobertM. Tyler, Jr. and ToddJ. WIcoxPollution Excluston Clauses: Problems in Interpretation and Application Under The Comprehensive GeneralLiabilityPolicy17 lDAHO L REv. 497,498 (1981).
17 Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 1246-48.
18 Tyler and Wilcox, supra note 16, at 499-500.
19 Soderstrom, supra note 8, at 766-67.
20 Id. at 766 (citing Fire Cas. & Sur. Bull., Casualty and Surety Sec., Public Liability, May 1971, at Cop-2).
21 Rosenakranz, supra note 15, at 1278.
22 GilbertL Bean, TheAccident Versus the Occurrence Concept, 1959 INs. LJ. 550,550 (1959). Mr. Bean was theassistantsecretaryof LibertyMutual Insurance Company
at the time he authored this article.
23 Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 1279. See also, Scott D. Mans, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Validity and Applicability, 26 Tor & Is. LJ. 662, 687-88 (1991).24 It has been suggested that of the few companieswho provide pollution related insurance, some have been forced to pull out of the market as a resultof reinsurance companies'
unwillingness to insure against major losses that are linked to insurance. Rosenkranz, supro note 15, at 1279. Also, rates have increased by as much as 200% and policy limitshave been drastically reduced to as little as $10 million or less. Only three or four of the fourteen companies that provided this type of insurance remain. Id. at 1279 & n.248(citing WAu. ST. J., March 19, 1985 at 1 (eastern ed.))
25 Id. at 1278-81.
26 Id. at 1279-80.
27 Id. Indeed, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), owners and operators of hazardous waste management facilities are required to post proof offinancial viability or acquire environmental damage liability insurance valued from $1 million to $6 million. Turner T. Smith, Jr., Environmental Damage Liability Insurance-
- A Primer, 39 Bus. LAw. 333, 334.
28 Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 1280.
29 Id. at 1279.
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victim, the environment."30
The stakes are too high to sit idly as
insurance companies and their insureds re-
sort to the arduous process of litigation,
further delaying the decontamination of pol-
luted sites. A more predictable and reason-
able interpretation would lead to fewer par-
ties willing to test the waters,31 and hence,
less litigation.3 z Less litigation, in turn, would
result in more efficient environmental clean-
ups. The current state of affairs consumes
too much time and too many resources
which could be better allocated to clean-up
activities and development of new anti-pollu-
tion technologies instead of being exhausted
in the courtroom. This comment will ad-
dress the construction, evolution, and future
direction of the pollution exclusion clause.
I. LEGAL HISTORY
A. The Comprehensive General Liabil-
ity Policy-Thevehicle used to insure most
commercial activity is the comprehensive
general liability policy ("CGL").' CGLs
typically contain pollution exclusion clauses.
Under the CGL, any analysis must assume
coverage.34 The language of this policy
standing alone is broad and probably the
chief cause of the-courts' varied results in
interpreting it. Under this regime, the courts
usually found the existence of coverage.
1. Accident-Based Coverage
Prior to 1966, the CGL covered only
damage attributable to an accident.s The
insurance industry intended that only "iden-
tifiable"36 events equivalent to a "sudden and
accidental" discharge would give rise to cov-
erage." The industry, however, left the term
"accident" undefined. The insurers feared
that coverage not confined to a referable
event would create a morale hazard because
of the undetectability inherent in gradual
damage."8 Indeed, in N.W. Elec. Power
Coop., Inc., v. American Motorists Ins.
Co.,39 the Court recognized that intentional
conduct was not a covered event under an
accident-based policy. 40 However, the in-
tentions of the insurers failed to impress
many courts.
A majority of the jurisdictions held that
the accident-based policy provided coverage
for unexpected events that occurred on rea-
sonably ascertainable dates.41 In White v.
Smith42 the court labeled the term "acci-
dent" "chameleonic."4 The White court
ruled that where a term is susceptible to a
different construction, the policy should be
interpreted in favor of the insured."4 In ruling
for the insured, the court found irrelevant
that the pollution resulted from contami-
nated water seeping into the ground over an
indeterminable period.45 Citing prior case
law, the court reasoned that "[t]he accident
mentioned in the policy need not be a blow
but may be a process."" The White court
reiterated the premise that when the results
of the insureds' acts were unintentional,
coverage would be found in most cases.47
The minority view added the temporal
requirement of suddenness to their construc-
tion." This view effectively excluded from
coverage any pollution event that could not
be pinpointed in time. American Casualty
Co. of Reading v. Minnesota Farm Bureau
Serv. Co.,49 is typical of this position. There
the court held that discharges from recurring
explosions over a six-year period were not
accidental.so In so concluding, the court
reasoned that acts performed with the
insured's knowledge "and which continue
over a long period of time and which con-
tinuously cause damage cannot be termed
accidents."s Coverage therefore failed.52
2. Occurrence-Based Coverage
In the face of public demand and the
30 Id. at 1240.
31 Seth A. Rlibner, Modern Environmental Insurance Law: "Sudden and Accidental," 63 ST. JoHN's L REv. 755, 773 (1989).
32 Currently, the insurers and insureds frequently re-litigate the same issues of liability; a more consistent interpretation would eliminate many of the more typical claims. Id.
33 Tyler and Wilcox, supra note 16, at 498. The clause generally reads as follows: "The company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the insured shall become
legally liable to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies caused by an occurrence." Soderstrom, supra note 8, at 764. (Tids
is the pre-1966 language.)
34 Tyler and Wilcox, supra note 16, at 498.
35 Hourihan, supra note 1, at 552.
36 Bean, supra note 22, at 551.
37 Hourihan, supra note 1, at 552.
38 Bean, supra note 22, at 553, 555. Bean asserted that "it would not be advisable to Insure in this area without the protection of a strong requirement that coverage apply
only if the gradual property damage were inadvertent... [llnsurers expected that they were eliminating coverage not only for conduct deliberately intended to injure or damage
someone, but for irresponsible and willful conduct, bome of gross indifference for the public safety which results in foreseeable injury or damage." Id.
39 N.W. Elec. Power, 451 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. App. 1969).
40 Id. at 364.
41 Tyler and Wilcox, supra note 16, at 499.
42 White, 440 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
43 Id. at 511.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 510.
46 Id. (quoting The Travelers v. Humming Bird Coal Co., 371 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Ky. 1963).)
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., Hutchens v. McClure, 269 P.2d 473 (Ks. 1954).
49 270 F.2d 686 (Minn. 1959).
50 Id. at 692.
51 Id. at 691.
52 Id.




judicial trend toward expanding coverageO
the insurance industry moved to occurrence-
based coverage from accident-based cover-
age in 1966." This clause lacked temporal
restrictions as to the insurable event.? In
adopting the new scheme, the industry aimed
to limit coverage to acts that were uninten-
tional and nonreckless" and, additionally, to
expand the scope of coverage by eliminating
the suddenness requirement.s' Two moti-
vating factors promptedthesechanges. First,
the industry wanted to clarify the meaning of
the word "accident," which they believed in
turn would limit their liability; and, second,
they wanted to correct what they perceived
as errors made by the courts in construing
the accident-based policy." The drafters
sacrificed the temporal requirement in order
to more clearly exclude pollution resulting
from intentional acts.
Under the new scheme, the term "oc-
currence" is defined as "an accident, includ-
ing continuous or repeated exposure to con-
ditions, which results in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor in-
tended from thestandpoint of the insured." 59
Clearly, this occurrence-based policy was
not meant to cover deliberate polluters, and,
more importantly, it was not intended to
cover damages which resulted from an
insured's gross indifference to safety."
However, the apparently dear language and
intent of the policy was muddled by the
synergetic effect of mounting environmental
pollution claims and a perceived need to
subsidize the clean-up. The product was
ever-expanding judicial creativity which fa-
vored coverage in most cases.
Most liability disputes under the occur-
rence-based policies hinged on the interpre-
tation of the phrase "neither expected nor
intended." The apparent failure of the indus-
try to clarify these terms was the crack in the
door many courts exploited to construe cov-
erage in instances which the industry had not
intended to insure.
InternationalMinerals& Chem. Corp.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., is indicative of
this line of cases. The dispositive factor in
construing coverage was "that the damage
was.unintended and unexpected from the
standpoint of the insured,"a not that the
polluting act was unintended. Similarly, in
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Martin Bros.
Constr. and Timber Corp.," the court held
that "[ilt is not the event, but the resulting
injury which must be expected,"" thereby
opening the floodgates of coverage to in-
clude pollution damages that were a result of
intentional conduct. The only exclusion, the
court reasoned, would be for damages that
were foreseeable with a "high degree of
certainty.""
Under this line of cases the court fo-
cused on the loss, not the act which caused
it." Simply put, if the loss was neither
expected nor intended by the insured, the
courts construed coverage. 7
City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casu-
alty and Sur. Cot,'" offered a slightly differ-
ent view. In this case, as under the majority
view, the court held that the term "acciden-
tal", as it appeared in the CGL, referred to
the foreseeability of the harm. But, the
Carter Lake court diverged from the major-
ity view by holding that no "occurrence"
existed when the insured knew or should
have known that a "substantial probability"
existed that his acts would result in dam-
age." Specifically, the insured's knowing
and deliberate failure to replace a faulty
pump did not constitute an "occurrence"
and the damage caused by the subsequent
malfunctions of that pump was, therefore,
not a covered event.70
B. The Pollution Exclusion Clause
With the implications of the majority
construction all too apparent, the insurance
industry again moved to sharply limit cover-
age. The vehicle this time was the pollution
exclusion clause.71 This clause amended the
Comprehensive General liability Policy in
55 Hollis M. Greenlaw, Comment, The CGL Policy And the Pollution Exclusion Clause: Using The Drafting History to Raise The Interpretation Out Of The Quagmire,23 Coun. J.L & Soc. Peoss. 233, 236 (1990). An occurrence is defined as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results during the policy
period, In bodily intay or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." Soderstrom, supra note 8, at 764.
56 Greenlaw, supra note 37, at 239.
57 Hourihan, supra note 1, at 553.
58 Greenlaw, supra note 55, at 238.
59 William R. Fish, An Overview of the 1973 Comprehensiue General Liability Insurance Policy and Products Liability Coverage, 34 J. Mo. BAR 257, 258 (1978).60 Greenlaw, supra note 55, at 238.
61 International Minerals & Chemical, 522 NE.2d 758 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988).(The definition of occurrence is substantially similar here as the definition mentioned in the body
of this Comment.) See also, e.g., Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chemicals, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio 1984); and Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384(D. Md. 1978).
62 International Minerals & Chem., 522 N.E.2d at 766 (emphasis added).
63 Martin Bros. Constr., 256 F.Supp. 145 (D. Or. 1966).
64 Id. at 150.
65 Id.
66 Mans, supra note 23, at 664.
67 See, e.g., International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758, 767 (Ill. Ct App. 1988).
68 Carter Lake, 604 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1979).
69 Id. at 1059.
70 Id.
71 Marrs, supra note 23, at 663.
72 Id. at 663. The language of the typical exclusion clause appears on pages 3-4, supra, of this Comment.
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Much to the consternation of the insur-
ers, the pollution exclusion clause failed to
eliminate inconsistent interpretation. The
reappearance of theword "accidental" in the
clause bears much of the blame.73 The
ambiguities of the words are apparent when
viewed as a single unit- the phrase "sudden
and accidental" connotes immediacy; con-
versely, it can also refer to an unexpected
result. 74 Indeed, one authority contends that
much of the litigation arising out of the
pollution exclusion clause turns on the mean-
ing of the phrase "sudden and accidental."75
The pollution exclusion clause shifts
the inquiry to the foreseeability of the dis-
charge that gives rise to the loss rather than
the foreseeability of the loss itself.76 The
court scrutinizes the act of the insured and
determines whether it was "sudden and ac-
cidental."n The United States District Court
for the District of Kansas followed this inter-
pretation when it held that the pollution
exclusion clause focuses on the "act of re-
leasing or discharging the pollutants."78
According to one commentator, the exclu-
sion enabled insurers "to perform their tradi-
tional function as insurers of the unexpected
event or happening and yet did not allow an
insured to seek protection from his liability
insurer if he knowingly polluted.""
As construction of the phrase "sudden
and accidental" determines most pollution
damage insurance claims, examining the
different ways in which courts address the
problem may be instructive of a better ana-
lytical approach. Sometimes the decisions
purport to rely on contract law but in actual-
ity are result-oriented.80 At other times, the
decisions reflect principles of contract inter-
pretation with little consideration for envi-
ronmental implications.s' Generally, courts
have subscribed to one of two approaches
when construing the exclusion clause.'
1."Reading Out" the Pollution Exclu-
sion
First is the line of cases that find the clause
ambiguous,83 and construe it as "coextensive
with the occurrence limitation."" In finding
for the insured, these courts reason that
standard form insurance policies are con-
tracts of adhesion, and therefore any ambi-
guities warrant a favorable construction for
the insured." The resulting interpretation
reads the pollution exclusion clause as "sim-
ply a restatement of the definition of 'occur-
rence'.... "
In these cases, the insureds argue that
the phrase "sudden and accidental" was not
defined within the policy and therefore it
should be interpreted in light of its "plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood mean-
ing."" The insureds resorted to any number
of dictionaries to substantiate their claim of
ambiguity. In response to these contentions,
the courts twisted the language of the exclu-
sion to such a degree, that they "effectively
read fit] out of the standard policy...."" With
the aid of two dictionaries, the Lansco court
reasoned that "sudden" connoted an unfore-
seen and unexpected event89 and that "acci-
dent" meant something that transpired un-
expectedly."0 The court held the insurer
liable.91
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v.
General Dynamics ("General Dynamics
1"),92 parallels this reasoning. The Court
reduced the key phrase "sudden and acci-
dental" to two discrete analyses. First, the
court concluded that under Missouri law the
term "accidental" described an incident that
was unforeseeable and unexpected but was
not necessarily sudden. 3 Second, the court
73 In the pollution exclusion clause the word "accidental" is accompanied by the word "sudden" (see pp. 5-6 of the text of this Comment)
74 Greenlaw, supro note 55, at 245.
75 Id. at 245 (citing 2 R. Long, The Law of Liability Insurance § 10A.02 (1987)). While there are a myriad of interpretations regarding insurance law, this comment is limited
to discussions of policy language on sudden and accidental questions.
76 Marrs, supra note 23, at 675.
77 Id.
78 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F.Supp 437, 447 (D. Kan. 1990), aff'd, 999 F.2d 489 (1993).
79 Soderstrom, supra note 8, at 768 (quoting Francis X. Bruton, Historical, Liability and Insurance Aspects of Pollution Claims, Proceedings of Insurance, Negligence
and Compensation Law Section, A.BA, 1971, p. 311.)
80 Garrett L Joest, M. Will Insurance Companies Clean the Augean Stables?- Insurance Coverage for the Landfill Operator, 50 Ins. CouNs. J. 258,261 (1983). "The
courts, faced with a dilemma of inadequate resources, have found coverage under preexisting policies in order to fund the dean-up of the environment and recompense those
persons injured by toxic waste." Id.
81 See, e.g., City of Carter Lakev. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 604 F.2d 1052 (8thCirc. 1979), American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423
(D. Kan. 1987), affd, 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated in part on reh'g, 946 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1991).
82 Ribner, supra note 31, at 764-66; Aetna Casually and Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 783 F.Supp. 1199, 1209 (ED. Mo. 1991), reo'd in part, 968 F.2d 707 (8th
Cir. 1992).
83 Lansco, Inc. v. Dep't of Environmental Protection, 350 A.2d at 524-25.
84 Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 1256.
85 Robert D. Chesteret al., Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coverage for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RurRais LJ. 9, 18 (1986).See, e.g., Denis
v. Woodmen Accident& Life Co., 334 N.W.2d 463 (Neb. 1983). Similar in result are Missouri cases that hold an insurance clause exclusionaryby nature must be construed against
the insurer. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Haas, 422 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Mo. 1968).
86 Jackson Township Municipal Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 994 (1982).
87 Lansco, 350 A.2d at 523.
88 Ribner, supra note 31, at 764.
89 Greenlaw, supra note 55, at 245. Lansco, 350 A.2d at 524.
90 Lansco, 350 A.2d at 524.
91 Id.
92 783 F. Supp. 1199, (E.D. Mo. 1991), ren'd in part, 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992) (General Dynamics I.
93 Id. at 1208 (citing Murphy v. Western & S'em Life Ins. Co., 262 S.W.2d 340,342 (Mo. Ct App. 1953)k St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d
361, 364 (8th Cir. 1966).
94 Id.
30 ML
held that because the term "sudden" was not
defined within the policy and was otherwise
ambiguous, the meaning which the insured
accorded to it should be considered.9 Here,
the court stated that the term "sudden" was
sufficiently ambiguous to nTilitate in favor of
coverage.95
In General Dynamics I the court did
not accord a separate definition to the term
"sudden." Rather, the court held that though
the pollution was gradual," the event was
"accidental" under the terms of the policy
since the damage was unexpected and unin-
tended.Y The determinative factor, the
court held, is the state of mind of the polluter
without regard to the duration of the pollu-
tion.9 In so concluding, the court cited the
drafting history of the pollution exclusion
clause as evidence of the industry's intent "to
exclude coverage only from accidental pollu-
tion occurrences."99 Decisions like this ef-
fectively nullified the pollution exclusion
clause.
a. Criticism: Unfaithful to the Insurers'
Intent
Two main criticisms plague this line of
cases. The principal criticism is that such a
construction contradicts the insurers' intent
in drafting the policies.1oo Despite the al-
leged facial ambiguity of the pollution exclu-
sion clause, the insurance industry intended
to exclude nearly every pollution claim.' 0'
Representations made by the industry when
the exclusion clause was implemented reflect
the intentions of the industry to exclude from
coverage the reckless and intentional pollut-
ers who failed to take reasonable steps to
prevent pollution.er Further, the insurers
felt that the pre-exclusion policy definition of
the term "occurrence" exposed them to
excessive liability.eas Thus, the critics assert,
the insurance industry had moved to curtail
liability, not to expand it.1o4
Soderstrom captured the intended shift
in focus: "Coverage for willful, intentional or
expectedviolationswastobeexcluded. Under
the policy, coverage was available as long as
the damage was not expected or intended.
With the pollution [exclusion], the question
was the intent of the insured in his actions,
rather than the results."os
Other bases exist with which to ascer-
tain the intent of the insurance industry. One
commentator proposes that the meaning of
the terms be interpreted in light of the
historical context of pollution claims."0s Such
a perspective leads to a more confining
construction of the pollution exclusion
clause."o Courts should take into account
that the policy drafters made the word "sud-
den" part of the exclusionary clause in re-
sponse to "the manner in which the courts
Pollution Exclusion Clause
had treated the 'caused by accident' lan-
guage in the pre-1966 standard liability
policy."os Additionally, at the time the
clause was drafted, few cases construed the
term "occurrence."'"
Another criticism leveled at the Gen-
eral Dynamics I line of cases, recognizes
that the industry-always intended to limit
coverage to sudden events as indicated by
the sale of gradual pollution policies at a
higher premium.110 If the industry had in-
tended to cover gradual damages from the
onset, this development would be illogical.1 n
These critics argue that in drafting the pollu-
tion exclusion, the industry intended to shift
the focus from the foreseeability of the harm
to the insured's knowledge concerning the
discharge.112
Conversely, supporters of the General
Dynamics I courts present strong argu-
ments that the insurance industry intended to
do no more than restate the definition of
occurrence in formulating the pollution ex-
clusion clause." 3 These proponents cite
statements by institutions within the insur-
ance industry as illustrative of this intent." 4
One such source states:
mhe exclusion simply reinforces
thedefinition of occurrence. That
is, the policy states that it will not
cover claims where the "damage
95 Id., "Interpretation in the insured's favor is particularly appropriate if an ambiguity arises in an exclusion, since the insurer there attempts to limit/exclude the insured's
coverage." Id. See also, e.g., Meyer Jewelry Co. v. General Ins. Co., 422 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1968), and Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1969).
96 General Dynamics 1, 783 F.Supp. at 1210. Here, pollutants seeped into the ground over a number of years. Id.
97 Id. at 1210.
98 Id. See also, Jackson Township Municipal Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990,994 (N.J. 1982Xholding pollution exclusion clause ambiguous
and merely a restatement of the term "occurrence").
99 General Dynamics 1, 783 F.Supp. at 1209.
100 Greenlaw, supra note 55, at 246. See also, Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 1252-53.
101 Greenlaw, supra note 55, at 248 (quoting letter from Graham V. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Manager, Insurance Rating Board, to the Honorable Samuel H. Weese, Insurance
Commissioner, State of West Virginia (July 31, 1970).)
102 Greenlaw, supra note 55, at 24647.
103 Soderstrom, supra note 8, at 767. "Mhe policy definition of occurrence included not only an accident, but also a continuous exposure to conditions which would obviously
include a great many pollution situations." Id.
104 Id. at 767-68.
105 Id. at 767.
106 Ribner, supra note 31, at 792-93.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 793 (quoting Wilmarth, Pollution Liability- What Are the Insurance Companies Doing in This Area? 21 FED'N INS. & CoRP. CouNs. Q. 18, 20-21 (1971)).
109 Id.
110 Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 1252.
111 Or, intent aside, it may simply be an insurance industry reaction to the construction of their policies.
112 Tyler and Wilcox, supra note 16, at 506.
113 Sheldon Hurwitz and Dan D. Kohane, The Love Canal-Insurance Coverage For Enuironmental Accidents, 50 Ins. CouNs. J. 378, 379 (1983).
114 Id.
115 Id. (quoting The Fire, Casualty & Surety Bulletin (the underwriter's handbook)).
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was expected or intended" by the
insured and the exclusion states,
in effect, that the policy will cover
incidents which are sudden and
accidental - unexpected and not
intended.is
The Illinois Court of Appeals in U.S.
Fidelity & Guaranty v. Specialty Coatings
Co.," in subscribing to this reasoning,11 7
held that the exclusion clause was ambigu-
ous and therefore must be interpreted in
favor of the insured.11s These arguments
offer a potent response to the critics who
claim that the courts fmustrated the intent of
the insurers. The intent of the industry,
however, should only be considered where
the clause has been declared ambiguous.
Otherwise, clear language should prevail
over a sketchy history of either party's intent.
b. Criticism: Result-Oriented Decisions
The other criticism of the General
Dynamics I line of cases is that these courts
are simply result-oriented.n 9 These critics
contend that courts construe an otherwise
dear clause as ambiguous in order to facili-
tate the finding of coverage, and thereby
subsidize environmental clean-up.120
Indeed, some courts appear wary of
this judicial "gerrymandering."121 In Inter-
national Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co.,'22 the court stated that
when construing insurance contracts
the court should neither distort
the meaning of the words so as to
reach a desired result nor search
for or invent ambiguities where
none exist but, rather, should
examine the policy as a whole
and, to the extent possible, give
effect to all provisions and inter-
pretwordsaccordingtotheirplain,
ordinaryand popular meanings.12s
A judicial declaration that the exclusion
clause is ambiguous often results from judi-
cial attempts to subsidize the clean-up. Typi-
cal is Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth.
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,124
where the court deemed irrelevant the fact
that the pollution events occurred on numer-
ous occasions and over an extended period
of time." Such a scenario constituted
"sudden and accidental" according to the
Jackson Township court.126 The Jackson
Township court arguably ignored the plain
and reasonable meaning of the term "sud-
den" in arriving at their decision. Certainly,
General Dynamics I is susceptible to all of
these criticisms as well.
Obviously, the decisions based on this
brand of judicial activism are difficult to
ascertain with complete accuracy. No court
explicitly professes its desire to circumvent
the plain meaning of the pollution exclusion
clause to subsidize environmental decon-
tanination. One authority, however, sug-
gests that this "gerrymandering" was in re-
sponse to non-industrial pollution occur-
rences, such as mudslides and crop spray-
ers.127 This assertion finds legitimacy in
those cases finding coverage where "un-
usual" pollution events occurred.128 In those
cases, the courts relied on the doctrine of
reasonable expectations to preclude the ex-
clusion where the pollution event and subse-
quentlawsuitwereatypical.' 2 The Wasmuth
court reasoned that a lay insured would
expect coverage for damage attributable to a
negligent installation of insulation.1so This
"unusual" event made the term "sudden and
accidental" ambiguous.'as But where there
are multiple claimants and far-reaching pol-
lution, and the potentially hazardous waste
has been deliberately disposed of causing
damage which is discovered years later, a
typical pollution event has occurred and the
pollution exclusion applies.132 In the large
majority of industrial pollution cases, how-
ever, the "unusual" exception will not save
coverage.
One author posits that in response to
inadequateresources, courts havebank-rolled
the environmental clean-up by finding cover-
age.m This criticism necessarily has some
116 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1989), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 133 (ll. 1989).
117 Id. at 1078. In addition to the historical background of the pollution exclusion clause, the court based its decision in part on the policy language. Id.
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supm note 15, at 1240; Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co.. 613 F.Supp 1549,1557 (D. N.J. 1985) ("...subjected
the policies to an interpretation designed to 'promote coverage' and to 'fulfill the dominant purpose of providing indemnification'."); Joest, suprm note 80, at 261.'The courts,
faced with a dilemma of inadequate resources, have found coverage under preexisting policies in order to fund the dean-up of the environment and recompense those person
injured by todc waste." Id.
120 Joest, supra note 80, at 261; Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 1240.
121 Rosenkranz, supro note 15, at 1253.
122 522 N.E.2d 758 (IL CL App. 1988).
123 Id. at 764.
124 451 A.2d 990 (1982).
125 Id. at 994-95.
126 Id.
127 Ribner, suprm note 31, at 766.
128 E.g., Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495 (Ninm. Ct. App. 1988).
129 Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. CL App. 1988).
130 Id. at 500.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 498.
133 Joest, supra note 80, at 261.
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validity. What else can describe the seem-
ingly contrived constructions of courts like
the Jackson Township court?
2. A New Trend: Strict Construction of
Exclusion Clauses
Recently, manycourts havedonean about-
face in interpreting pollution exclusion
dauses.m3 Thetrend is toward judicial adop-
tion of the industry position on the meaning
of the exclusion clause.135 Many courts now
tend to focus on the insured's state of mind
with respect to the discharge rather than the
resulting damage, and accordingly construe
the term "sudden" as meaning "abrupt" or
"immediate."a
Representative of these cases is Ameri-
can Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host
Corp.m There, the court lambasted its
counterparts which declared the pollution
exclusion ambiguous, stating that the lan-
guage is so clear that "only a lawyer's inge-
nuity could make [it] ambiguous."ms The
court reasoned that even if the term "acci-
dental" was ambiguous, the term "sudden"
was not susceptible to subjective construc-
tion. 39 "[D]eclin[ing] to contort the plain
language of the policy,""o the court held that
a seventy-five year pollution event was not
"sudden" and accordingly granted the in-
surer summary judgment.141
Waste Mgmnt. v. Peerless Ins. Co.,142
simplifies the ambiguity and subjective is-
sues. In Waste Mgmnt., the North Carolina
Supreme Court declared the pollution exclu-
sion clause unambiguous. In making this
determination, the court reduced the policy
to its constituent parts and considered each
part separately. The resulting opinion con-
sisted of a clearly reasoned three-part analy-
sis.'4 The CGL policy, the pollution exclu-
sion clause, and the exception to the pollu-
tion clause were the foci of the analysis.'s In
so narrowing the focus, the court held that
the term "occurrence" under the CGL pro-
vided coverage for unintentional and unex-
pected events.4's Further, the court pared
the inquiry under the exclusionary clause to
whether the incident in fact constituted a
polluting event.'" Finally, the court held the
exception to the pollution exclusion took
effect only upon an instantaneous event.'47
I. AN ExAMINATrNOFN MISSOURI LAW
Aetna Casualty& Sur. Co. v. General
Dynamics Corp.("GeneralDynamicsH",'"
ovemiled the part of General Dynamics I
that construed the terms "sudden and acci-
dental."'" General Dynamics II supports
the line of cases holding the pollution exclu-
sion clause unambiguous, and pursuant to
the general precepts of contract law ac-
corded the terms their ordinary meaning.so
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
General Dynamics II noted that under
Missouri law, all tenns of a contract must be
given meaning.' 5' Consequently, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri erred when it failed to define the
term "sudden" and the term "accidental"
separately.'2 The origin of the misconstruc-
tion lies in the conceptualization of the two
terms as a single phrase, and not as seman-
tically discrete words. In fact, the court held,
defining each of these two words separately
purges the clause of any ambiguity.1s Spe-
cifically, the lower court found "sudden"
ambiguous because it could altemately mean
unexpected or abrupt.'" However, this
construction was unsatisfactory according to
the General Dynamics II court because the
term "accidental" encompasses the unex-
pected, thereby necessarily rendering "sud-
den" the equivalent of abrupt.'" Any other
reading "would render the word 'sudden'
superfluous."'"
Recently two other federal courts of
appeals doncurred with the reasoning of
General Dynamics I. In United States
Fidelity& Guaranty Co. v. Morrison Grain
Co.,m7 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
applying Kansas law, held the term "sudden
and accidental" unambiguous.'" Accord-
134 Ribner, supra note 31, at 766.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 766-67.
137 667 F.Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987), affd, 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated in part on reh'g, 946 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1991). See also, United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., Inc., 734 F.Supp. 437 (D. Kan. 1990).
138 General Host, 667 F.Supp. at 1429.
139 Id. at 1428. At a minimum, the term "sudden" must refer to an event that happens on brief notice and unexpectedly. Id.
140 Id. at 1429.
141 Id. at 1427. Thus coverage was excluded via the pollution exclusion clause.
142 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986).
143 See Greenlaw, supra note 55, at 261.
144 Waste Management, 340 S.E.2d at 382.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 380.
147 Id. at 382. The Illinois Court of Appeals employed a similar analysis in International Minerals & Chem. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 522 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. CL 1988).
148 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992), reu'g 783 F.Supp. 1199 (ED. Mo. 1991).
149 Id. at 710.
150 See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F.Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987); Int'I Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
151 General Dynamics 1, 968 F.2d at 710 (citing Hamden v. Continental Ins. Co., 612 S.W.2d 392,394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 General Dynamics 1, 783 F.Supp. at 1208.
155 General Dynamics II, 968 F.2d at 710. Note that the General Dynamics [Court defined the term "accident" as a matterof lawand found ambiguity in theterm "sudden,"
whereas the General Dynamics II Court chose to define "sudden" objectively.
156 Id.
157 Morrison Grain, 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993). (See summary at 1 Mo. ENvrL L & Po.v REv. 97 (1993)).
158 Id. at 493.
159 Id. at 491.
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ingly, no coverage existed where containers
holding pesticides rusted and subsequently
disintegrated contaminating the surrounding
area." The court reasoned that to assign a
single meaning to "sudden and accidental"
would frustrate Kansas law which mandates
that all terms of a contract be given mean-
ing."'6 Additionally, the court held that the
term "sudden and accidental" has an "objec-
tive temporal meaning,"16' thereby making
the intent of the insured immaterial.1'6 2
Interpreting Minnesota law, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Gr-
cuit ruled similarly.'" In citing to General
Dynamics II, the Bureau of Engraving
court held that if the term "sudden" meant
unexpected, then the term "accidental" was
redundant.'" The court accorded "sudden"
temporal meaning and denied coverage to
the insured where hazardous wastes leaked
from barrels for a period of ten years.'es
Interestingly, theBureau ofEngravingcourt
also distinguished the instant case from those
cases dealing with "unusual" pollution events
and indicated that where an event was "un-
usual," the pollution exclusion would be
inapplicable. 166
The regional trend is unmistakable:
courts utilize traditional. tenets of contract
law to find that pollution events are pre-
cluded from coverage by the pollution exclu-
sion clause. It seems as though the clause is
finally receiving the construction the insurers
intended. Now that they are often faced with
sole liability for their pollution, maybe the
insureds will reprioritize their commitment to
a clean environment.
El. Poucy ANALYsis
The recent shift in focus comes as a
welcome change for a number of reasons.
Most importantly, the strict construction of
the exception to the pollution exclusion
clauses will galvanize a sense of increased
responsibility on the part of those entities
involved with potential pollutants.
Generally, change in any industry will
not occur without some motivating force.
The industry of polluters is no different
Therein lies the mechanism for providing a
cleaner environment By mandating that a
pollution exclusion be part of all policies,
insureds will be compelled to develop inno-
vative anti-pollution measures as a check on
their potentially enormous liability.'67 How-
ever, this mechanism for change has been
repeatedly rendered ineffective by the judi-
ciary.
The State of New York, as a matter of
public policy, enacted just such a statute'"as
a means of promoting a clean environ-
ment.6 This statute mandated that the
pollution exclusion be part of all CGLs.o70
The statute's principal purpose lay in keep-
ing the polluters from taking advantage of
the opportunity to spread the risk of loss that
their pollution caused.' 7' The concern of the
Legislature was that a polluter could spend a
minimal amount of money to insure against
extensive pollution-related damages whereas
if the same entity was directly liable for those
damages, it would have an incentive to more
closely monitor its behavior.172 Governor
Rockefeller explained upon signing the bill
that it would "preclude any insurance com-
pany from undermining public policy by
offering this type of insurance protection."173
This law, however, was later repealed based
on the perceived need to compensate vic-
tin.1 74 Ironically, an identical rationale
contributed to the problems in defining the
coverage limits of pollution exclusion clauses
in the first place.
The intent of laws like this is unmistak-
able: make industry responsible for its ac-
tions. Still, these laws do not provide the
definitive solution since all standard form
CGLs contain pollution exclusion clauses
anyway. Rather, by implementing such a
law, a legislature would manifest its intoler-
ance for irresponsible industry. Faced with
the pressure of a such a mandate, courts, in
turn, may feel compelled to construe the
160 Id. at 493.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Bureau of Engraving, Inc., v. Federal Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 1993).
164 Id. at 1177.
165 Id. at 1177-78.
166 Id. at 1176-77. (See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.)
167 Note that in most cases the insureds are in a much better position to research and develop new technologies to combat pollution than are the insurers with their cadre of
actuaries and lawyers.
168 N.Y. Ins. LAw § 46 (McKinney 1971) (repealed 1982).
169 AlState Ins. Co. v. Klock.Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486,487-88,426 N.Y.S.2d 603,604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
170 N.Y. Ins. LAw § 46 (McKinney 1971) (repealed 1982).
171 Id.
172 Niagara County v. Utica Mut Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415,418,439 N.Y.S.2d 538,540 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
173 Memoraindum of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, reprinted in 1971 N.Y. Laws 2633 (quoted in Rosenkranz, suprm note 15, at 1253, and at n.83.)
174 Rosenkranz, supra note 15, at 1269 and n.173.
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exclusion clauses as just that - an exclusion
with few exceptions. Certainly with such a
policy on the legislative record, courts would
not be so prone to blur clear language.
Indeed, those courts initiating the trend
toward strict construction have remarked on
the necessity of such a public policy. In
Bureau of Engraving v. Federal Ins. Co.,' 75
the Court, in denying coverage, stated that
such a construction acted as a deterrent to
those who negligently and recklessly handle
contaminants in that they could no longer
"hid[e] behind their ignorance."' 76 TheCourt
added that its construction eliminated from
coverage those damages caused by pollution
that results from ordinary business prac-
tices. 7
Environmental damages claims ought
tobegiven specialscrutinyforreasonsunique
to the fields of property insurance and pri-
vate industry. Inherent in this assertion is the
general belief that private industry views
pollution issues as an economic problem and
not a social problem. 17  In other words,
imposing upon their consciences will not be
an effective deterrent; reducing their bank
accounts will.
Of equal importance are those intrinsic
difficulties present in providing property in-
surance that other types of personal insur-
ance do not experience.'7 9 Gilbert Bean
attributes these problems to society's covet-
ousness of material things and to the ten-
dency of individuals to be less conscientious
when safeguarding their property as com-
pared to safeguarding their person.iso Mark
Greene attests to the truth of this human
trait-
[Slupposethatmanagers of Com-
pany ABC believe that the federal
govemment will provide disaster
assistance that will fully compen-
sateABC forall earthquakelosses
it may incur. In making plans for
a new building near a major fault
line, ABC management may be
tempted to ignore more expen-
sive construction designs and pro-
cedures that can lessen damage
from earthquakes. In essence,
ABC's assumption regarding the
potential for federal disaster aid
makes its management indiffer-
ent to the prospect of loss and,
therefore, more prone to more
careless decisions.' 8 1
Certainly, this example depicts a prob-
lem inherent in insuring against property
damage. The state of our environment
indicates that this phenomenon is probably
not atypical. With this built-in "morale haz-
ard,"182 the pollution exclusion clause should
be a check on the apathy inspired by insur-
ance rather than a clause which enables it
The accountability afforded by strict inter-
pretation may be the impetus necessary for
change.
Decreased vigilance is not the only
problem with which insurers must contend.
Not only are people less likely to be con-
cemed with damaging the environment, Bean
implicitly asserts that in fact a certain temp-
tation to pollute exists among those inclined
to act unscrupulously.s Simply put, since
pollution damage is usually gradual and is not
detected for years, the would-be polluters
can feel reasonably certain that they will
escape responsibility for the damages.'" In
this regard, when a court construes the
"sudden and accidental" clause to cover
gradual damages caused by intentional con-
duct, it passes a disproportionate risk of
dishonesty to the insurers. A construction
more in accord with the plain meaning of the
words compensates for the risk intrinsic in
insuring against pollution damages.
Construing the pollution exclusion
clause as it was intended - that is, as a
preclusion to most environmental damage
claims - will lead to greater accountability
and responsibility among those handling
potential contaminants. In turn, less such
claims will arise in the future, resulting in
what most advocates have demanded all
along: a cleaner environment
175 793 F.Supp. 209 (D. Minn. 1992), affrd, 5 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 1993).
176 Id. at 213.
177 Id.
178 Soderstrom, supra note 8, at 763.
179 See generally Bean, supro note 22, at 552-53.
180 Id. at 552-53.
181 MARK R. Gma et al., RIK AmQ iNsURANCE 11(8th ed. 1992).
182 Id. Greene characterizes the morale hazard as "circumstances [whichl may cause someone to be Indifferent to the possibility of a loss, thus causing that person to behave
in a careless manner." Id.
183 Bean, supra note 22, at 553.
184 Id.
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